Inflation scares and forecast-based monetary policy by Athanasios Orphanides & John C. Williams
 
Working Paper Series 
 
 
Inflation Scares and Forecast-Based Monetary Policy 
 
Athanasios Orphanides and John C. Williams 
 





The authors would like to thank George Evans, Ben Friedman, Peter Ireland, Lars Svensson, and participants at 
presentations at the University of California, Berkeley, the Norges Bank, meetings of the Econometric Society, the American 
Economic Association, the Society for Computational Economics, and at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Conference on 
Learning, March 21–22, 2003, for useful comments and discussions on earlier drafts. This paper was presented at the 
Monetary Policy and Learning Conference sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta in March 2003. The views 
expressed here are the authors’ and not necessarily those of management of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, or the Federal Reserve System. Any remaining errors are the authors’ responsibility. 
 
Please address questions regarding content to Athanasios Orphanides, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
Washington, D.C. 20551, 202-452-2654, athanasios.orphanides@frb.gov, or John C. Williams, Research Department, Federal 
Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 101 Market Street, San Francisco, California 94105, 415-974-2240, john.c.williams@sf.frb.org. 
 
The full text of Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta working papers, including revised versions, is available on the Atlanta Fed’s 
Web site at http://www.frbatlanta.org. Click on the “Publications” link and then “Working Papers.” To receive notification 
about new papers, please use the on-line publications order form, or contact the Public Affairs Department, Federal Reserve 
Bank of Atlanta, 1000 Peachtree Street, N.E., Atlanta, Georgia 30309-4470, 404-498-8020. 
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta 




Inflation Scares and Forecast-Based Monetary Policy 
 
 
Athanasios Orphanides, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 





Abstract: Central banks pay close attention to inflation expectations. In standard models, however, inflation 
expectations are tied down by the assumption of rational expectations and should be of little independent 
interest to policy makers. In this paper, the authors relax the assumption of rational expectations with perfect 
knowledge and reexamine the role of inflation expectations in the economy and in the conduct of monetary 
policy. Agents are assumed to have imperfect knowledge of the precise structure of the economy and the 
policymakers’ preferences. Expectations are governed by a perpetual learning technology. With learning, 
disturbances can give rise to endogenous inflation scares, that is, significant and persistent deviations of 
inflation expectations from those implied by rational expectations. The presence of learning increases the 
sensitivity of inflation expectations and the term structure of interest rates to economic shocks, in line with the 
empirical evidence. The authors also explore the role of private inflation expectations for the conduct of 
efficient monetary policy. Under rational expectations, inflation expectations equal a linear combination of 
macroeconomic variables and as such provide no additional information to the policy maker. In contrast, under 
learning, private inflation expectations follow a time-varying process and provide useful information for the 
conduct of monetary policy. 
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 1 Introduction
Inﬂation expectations play a central role in the monetary policy process. Central banks
regularly monitor and analyze information regarding inﬂation expectations, as reﬂected in
surveys or nancial markets.1 Moreover, forecasts of inﬂation are at the center of policy
deliberations at inﬂation-targeting central banks and have arguably been equally important
for policy decisions in non-inﬂation-targeting central banks such as the Federal Reserve and
the European Central Bank.
Why do inﬂation expectations receive so much attention at central banks? One reason
is that policymakers at the Federal Reserve and at central banks in many other nations
have long recognized that monetary policy can be more successful when inﬂation expecta-
tions are well-anchored.2 When inﬂation expectations become unmoored from the central
bank's objectives|episodes that Goodfriend (1993) characterized as \inﬂation scares"|
macroeconomic stabilization can suer. A second reason often cited is the lagged eect
of monetary policy actions on output and inﬂation, rst noted by Jevons (1863) and later
made famous by Friedman (1961). Given the existence of a substantial monetary policy
lag, it makes sense for policy decisions to be preemptive, that is, to be based on expected
future conditions when the eects of the policy action will rst take hold. And, in fact,
policymakers frequently stress the importance of preemptive policy action for this reason.3
In addition, inﬂation forecasts may be useful in policy deliberations and decisions, because
they summarize a wide variety of information related to past and anticipated economic
1In the United States, regular surveys of inﬂation expectations of households and private economists are
conducted. In addition, the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia publishes a quarterly report of expectations
from the Survey of Professional Forecasters. The European Central Bank, Bank of England, Reserve Bank
of New Zealand, Reserve Bank of Australia, and Sveriges Riksbank regularly report on similar surveys
of forecasts. Information regarding inﬂation expectations derived from comparisons of prices on inﬂation-
indexed and nominal government securities is also regularly presented by several central banks, including
the European Central Bank, Reserve Bank of Australia, and Sveriges Riksbank. Such information is also
available at the Federal Reserve (Greenspan, 2000).
2For example, Federal Reserve Chairman Greenspan said in May 2001: \We have often pointed before to
the essential role that low inﬂation expectations play in containing price pressures and promoting growth.
Any evident tendency in nancial markets or in household and business attitudes for such expectations to
trend higher would need to factor importantly into our policy decisions."
3Recent examples of such policymaker views at the Federal Reserve can be found in Greenspan (2001),
Meyer (2002), and Bernanke (2003); indeed, recognition of the value of preemptive policies can be traced
virtually to the founding of the Federal Reserve System in 1913 (Orphanides, 2003b). Views of policymakers
from other central banks are reﬂected in King (2000), Issing (2000), Gjedrem (2001), and Bollard (2002).
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Model-based monetary policy evaluations, however, provide little support for these ar-
guments for the value of inﬂation expectations in the design and conduct of monetary policy.
Under rational or \adaptive" expectations, inﬂation expectations are well-anchored as long
as policy satises basic stability principles, for example that the central bank raises real
interest rates when inﬂation rises above target and vice versa. And, Levin, Wieland, and
Williams (2003) nd that forecast-based policy rules provide only trivial gains in terms of
macroeconomic stability over simple policy rules that respond to current output and inﬂa-
tion and the lagged interest rate; importantly, their study includes medium- and large-scale
macro models that incorporate a central role for expectations formation and substantial
policy lags.5 More generally, the literature has documented that simple rules, whereby the
policy instrument responds to a few observed variables, perform remarkably well in a wide
variety of macro models.6 Taken together, these ndings call into question some of the
standard reasons why policymakers should be concerned with inﬂation expectations.
One potential source of this apparent disconnect between policy practice and policy mod-
eling may be identied in the rigid imposition of rational expectations in macroeconometric
models with an assumed xed and known structure. The policy evaluations described above
generally assume a xed and perfectly known structure of the economy and specify that
expectations are model-consistent. In linear xed-parameter models of this nature, for ex-
ample, once the monetary policy rule is specied, inﬂation expectations can be represented
as a xed linear function of economic outcomes.7 Economic agents are then assumed to
form expectations mechanically based on these simple linear functions of economic outcomes
4Svensson (1997), Giannoni and Woodford (2002), and Svensson and Woodford (2003) also argue that
monetary policy is best thought of in terms of an optimal targeting rule in which policy reacts to past,
present, and forecasted values of target variables, including inﬂation. Accordingly, inﬂation expectations are
a key determinant of the setting of policy.
5Not surprisingly, this nding also obtains in small-scale models studied by Svensson (1997), Ball (1999),
Rudebusch and Svensson (1999), Orphanides and Wieland (2000), and Orphanides (2003a). However, these
models contain only a small number of state variables, thereby restricting the potential usefulness of forecasts
for policy.
6See Bryant, Hooper, Mann (1993) and Taylor (1999a) for collections of policy evaluations studies, and
Taylor (1999b), Orphanides and Williams (2002), Levin and Williams (2003), and references therein.
7For the purposes of this discussion we assume existence of a well behaved unique rational expectations
solution. See, however, Bernanke and Woodford (1997), Evans and Honkapojha (2001b) and Bullard and
Mitra (2002) for comparisons of outcome- and forecast-based policies in terms of equilibrium stability and
determinacy.
2that are assumed to be perfectly known. From a modeling perspective these assumptions
greatly simplify the analysis. But what if agents are, in fact, less than perfectly certain of
the structure of the model, its time invariance, or simply the values of the model parame-
ters? Once imperfect knowledge is acknowledged, the tight mechanical link from economic
outcomes to the expectations formation process breaks down. As stressed by Friedman
(1979) and Sargent (1993), the explicit learning process that economic agents are assumed
to employ to form expectations should then be examined instead.
Concern for misspecication of the expectations formation process is not merely a the-
oretical curiosity. Episodes when expectations appeared to have become unmoored from
the policymakers' objectives can be easily identied in the monetary history of the United
States and other nations. For example, such an episode occurred in the United States at the
very end of the 1970s inﬂationary experience. Reﬂecting on the evolution of inﬂation expec-
tations in December, 1980, Chairman Volcker noted: \With all its built-in momentum and
self-sustaining expectations, [the inﬂationary process] has come to have a life of its own."
Fears of inﬂation or deﬂation, whether entirely justied from the policymakers' perspective
or not, seemed to have inﬂuenced actual decision-making and economic behavior at times,
presenting real complications for policy decisions. This is the essence of how the inﬂation
scare problem described by Goodfriend (1993) complicates monetary policy decisions in
practice.
In this paper we break the tight link between inﬂation expectations and observable macro
variables by positing that agents do not know with certainty the parameters of the model
but instead constantly update their estimates based on the information available to them.
We explore two related issues. First, we examine the occurrence and properties of inﬂation
scares, dened to be deviations of inﬂation expectations from those implied by rational
expectations, under learning. Under rational expectations, long-run inﬂation expectations
are well anchored and are therefore insensitive to shocks. In contrast, under perpetual
learning, we nd that long-run inﬂation expectations drift endogenously in response to
macroeconomic disturbances in a pattern supported by the evidence on the excess sensitivity
of yields on long-term bonds to aggregate shocks. The prevalence and severity of endogenous
3inﬂation scares is aected by the monetary policy in place, with policies that emphasize
output stabilization more prone to inﬂation scares. Second, we compare the performance
of policies based on observed outcomes to those based on inﬂation expectations.
In our model, forecast-based and outcome-based policies are isomorphic under the as-
sumption of rational expectations. We show, however, that forecast-based and outcome-
based policies are no longer identical when knowledge is imperfect and inﬂation expec-
tations cannot be summarized as a simple function of inﬂation outcomes. Under these
circumstances, monitoring and responding to the public's inﬂation expectations, in addi-
tion to monitoring the evolution of actual inﬂation, leads to improved policy outcomes. In
our analysis we also dierentiate between the public's expectations and the policymaker's
inﬂation forecasts under the assumption that the policymaker knows the structure of the
economy and explore the marginal value of reliance on additional information about the
economy for policy design.
2 The Model Economy
We adopt a simple two-equation macroeconomic model that gives rise to a nontrivial
inﬂation-output variability tradeo. The properties of this model are described in greater
detail in Orphanides and Williams (2003).8
The central bank's objective is to design a policy rule that minimizes the loss, denoted
by L, equal to the weighted average of the asymptotic variances of the output gap, y,a n d
of deviations of inﬂation, , from the target rate, ,
L =( 1− !)Va r(y)+!Var( − ); (1)
where Va r(z) denotes the unconditional variance of variable z,a n d! 2 (0;1] is the relative
weight placed on inﬂation stabilization.
We assume that the policymaker can set policy during period t so as to determine the
intended level of the output gap for period t +1 ,xt, subject to a control error, ut+1,
yt+1 = xt + ut+1 u  iid(0;2
u): (2)
8See also Clark, Goodhart, and Huang (1999) and Lengwiler and Orphanides (2002).
4Inﬂation is determined by a modied Lucas supply function that allows for some intrinsic
inﬂation persistence,
t+1 = e
t+1 +( 1− )t + yt+1 + et+1;e  iid(0;2
e); (3)
where e is the private agents' expected inﬂation rate based on time t information, y is the
output gap,  2 (0;1), >0, and e is a serially uncorrelated innovation. In this setting,
an interpretation of 1 −  is the fraction of agents who raise prices based on the latest
observed inﬂation rate.9 For these agents, price-setting is invariant to the expectations
formation mechanism. The fraction , then, serves as an index of the sensitivity of inﬂation
movements to the expectations formation mechanism in this economy and becomes a crucial
parameter in the model. If  is small, expectations and their evolution are unimportant in
this economy.
3 Optimal Policy under Perfect Knowledge
We begin by considering the benchmark case of \perfect knowledge," where private agents
know the structure of the economy and the central bank's policy. In this case, expectations
are rational in that they are consistent with the true data-generating process of the model
economy. Later we turn to the case of imperfect knowledge, where agents do not know the
structural parameters of the model, but instead must form expectations based on estimated
forecasting models.
Under the assumption of perfect knowledge, the optimal policy is given by the Euler












This expression can can be equivalently restated in a number of ways, two of which we
consider here. In the rst, the optimal policy relates the intended output gap to the inﬂation
gap, the dierence between the observed inﬂation rate and its target. We refer to such rules
as \outcome-based" in that they respond to observed outcomes of inﬂation. In the second,
9This specication, where a portion of inﬂation expectations is indexed to past inﬂation, is similar to
those of Gali and Gertler (1999) and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2001).
5the intended output gap is related to the dierence between the expected rate of inﬂation
and the target. We refer to these rules as \forecast-based" rules.
Specifying monetary policy in terms of an outcome-based rule, the intended output gap
is given by:
xt = −(t − ); (5)
where  > 0 measures the responsiveness of the intended output gap to the inﬂation gap.
The optimal value of , denoted by 


















A for 0 <!<1: (6)
In the limit, when ! equals unity (that is, when the policymaker is not at all concerned with
output stability), the policymaker sets the real interest rate so that inﬂation is expected to














1 −  − 
1 − 
t: (7)
Substituting this expression for expected inﬂation into equation (3) yields the rational







)t + et+1 + ut+1: (8)
The autocorrelation of inﬂation is decreasing in !, with a limiting value approaching unity
when ! approaches zero and zero when ! equals one. That is, if the central bank cares only
about output stabilization, the inﬂation rate becomes a random walk, while if the central
bank cares only about inﬂation stabilization, the inﬂation rate displays no serial correlation.
As noted above, the optimal policy rule can be rewritten in terms of the expected
inﬂation gap:
xt = −e(e
t+1 − ); (9)
where e > 0 measures the responsiveness of the intended output gap to the expected
inﬂation gap. The optimal value of e is proportional to the optimal value of  (the
6responsiveness to the actual output gap), with the factor of proportionality equal to the








for ! 2 (0;1). In the limiting case of ! ! 1, the optimal value of e becomes innite and
the equivalence between the optimal policies breaks down. We limit our analysis to values
of ! 2 (0;1).
In the following, we consider two values of , a baseline value, 0.90, and a smaller value,
0.75. For smaller values of , the eect of learning on inﬂation dynamics is muted owing to
the smaller role of expectations. To ease comparisons of policy and model properties for the
two values of ,w es e t so that the optimal policy under perfect knowledge is identical in
the two cases. Specically, for  =0 :75 we set  =0 :25 and for  =0 :90, we set  =0 :10.
In all cases, we assume e = u =1 .
Figure 1 shows the optimal values of  and e for values of ! between zero and one.
Note that the optimal value of each parameter depends only on ! and the ratio =(1 − )
thus is invariant to the two model parameterizations considered here. As seen in the gure,
e is much more sensitive to ! than is . This increased sensitivity to ! reﬂects the
reduction in the autocorrelation of inﬂation as ! increases.
4 The Economy with Perpetual Learning
We now relax the assumption that private agents have perfect knowledge of all structural
parameters and the policymaker's preferences. Instead, we posit that agents must infer
the information necessary for forming expectations by observing historical data, in essence
acting like econometricians who know the correct specication of the economy but are
uncertain about the parameters of the model. In particular, we assume that private agents
update the coecients of their model for forecasting inﬂation using least squares learning
with nite memory. Least squares learning possesses a number of desirable properties: it is
straightforward to implement and it appears to correspond closely to the practice of real-
world forecasters. Estimation with nite memory reﬂects agents' concern for changes in the
structural parameters of the economy. To focus our attention on the role of imperfections
7in the expectations formation process itself, we do not explicitly model the properties of
structural change that would justify such concerns. That is, we do not include shocks to the
structural parameters of the model in our simulations. Nor do we model the policymaker's
knowledge or learning, but instead focus on the implications of policy based on simple
time-invariant rules that do not require explicit treatment of the policymaker's learning
problem.
As in Orphanides and Williams (2003), we model \perpetual learning" by assuming
that agents employ a constant gain in their recursive least squares estimation problem. In
essence, this assumes that agents place greater weight on more recent observations in esti-
mation.10 This algorithm is equivalent to applying weighted least squares where the weights
decline geometrically with the distance in time between the observation being weighted and
the most recent observation. This approach is closely related to the use of xed sample
lengths or rolling-window regressions to estimate a forecasting model (Friedman 1979). In
our model, this learning mechanism implies that a simple AR process with nite memory
is used for forecasting. This approach can be conveniently generalized in more compli-
cated models to an economy where agents use VARs for forecasting based on nite memory
estimation.
As already noted, the reduced form of inﬂation under perfect knowledge in our model
is given by an AR(1). Correspondingly, we assume that agents attempt to estimate the
coecients of the following equation:
i = c0;t + c1;ti−1 + vi: (11)
To x notation, let Xi and ci be the 2  1 vectors, Xi =( 1 ; i−1)0,a n dci =( c0;i;c 1;i)0.
Using data through period t, the least squares regression parameters for equation (11) can
be written in recursive form:
ct = ct−1 + tR−1
t Xt(t − X0
tct−1); (12)
Rt = Rt−1 + t(XtX0
t − Rt−1) (13)
10Inﬂation expectations with learning based on such constant gain algorithms have been investigated in
detail by Sargent (1999), Evans and Honkapohja (2001a), and Evans and Ramey (2001).
8where t is the gain. With least squares learning and innite memory, t =1 =t,s oa s
t increases, t converges to zero. As a result, as the data accumulate, this mechanism
converges to the correct expectations function and the economy converges to the perfect
knowledge benchmark solution. As noted above, to formalize perpetual learning we replace
the decreasing gain in the innite memory recursion with a small constant gain, >0.
With imperfect knowledge, expectations are based on the perceived law of motion of
the inﬂation process governed by the perpetual learning algorithm described above. The
model under imperfect knowledge consists of the structural equation for inﬂation (3), the
output gap equation (2), the monetary policy rule (5), and the one-step-ahead forecast for
inﬂation, given by
e
t+1 = c0;t + c1;tt; (14)
where c0;t and c1;t are updated according to equations (12) and (13).
In the limit of perfect knowledge (that is, as  ! 0), the expectations function above
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As we deviate from this limiting case, for small positive , expectations are imperfectly
rational in that agents need to estimate the reduced form equations they use to form expec-
tations. Nonetheless, as shown in Orphanides and Williams (2003), expectations are nearly
rational in that the forecasts are close to being ecient, and the reduced form parameters
of the process governing expectations, c0;t and c1;t, remain close to what their values would
be under perfect knowledge, cP
0 and cP
1 .
5 Learning and Inﬂation Scares
As noted in the introduction, inﬂation scares, i.e., increases in long-run inﬂation expectations|
evidenced by shifts in the yield curve|that are unexplained by economic developments are
a recurring feature of the U.S. economy (Goodfriend, 1993, Ireland, 1996). Although some
9instances of inﬂation scares may be associated with discrete events, others appear to develop
endogenously through a conﬂuence of economic developments. In this section, we examine
the response of inﬂation, expected inﬂation, and output to shocks in our model economy. A
related issue that has long puzzled researchers is the high correlation between movements
in the entire yield curve and a wide variety of apparently transitory shocks . We take that
issue up in the following section.
In calibrating the model for our illustrative simulations, we set  =0 :05.(See Orphanides
and Williams (2003) for a discussion of the sensitivity of results to .) We concentrate on
the baseline parameterization  =0 :9a n d =0 :1. To illustrate the eects of learning
under dierent policies, we consider three pairs of alternative policies, corresponding to the
optimal policies under perfect knowledge for policymakers with preferences with a relative
weight on inﬂation, !: 0.25, 0.50, and 0.75. For the forecast-based policy rule, we assume
that the policymaker observes and responds to the private forecast. Note that this does
not necessarily correspond to the policymaker's own forecast, which may incorporate other
information.
5.1 The Response of the Economy to an Inﬂation Shock
We rst consider the dynamic response of the model economy to a one-period 2 percentage
point shock to inﬂation. In our model, the responses of inﬂation and inﬂation expectations
to an output shock (or policy control error) are observationally equivalent to a shock to
inﬂation (after appropriate scaling) so we do not report on it separately. Note that although
the model is linear in the limiting case of perfect knowledge, under least squares learning
the model responses depend nonlinearly on the initial values of the states c and R.I nt h e
following, we report the average response from 1000 simulations, each of which starts from
initial conditions drawn from the relevant steady-state distribution.
Under perfect knowledge, the shock prompts a policy response starting in the following
period, leading to a temporary decline in the output gap and a gradual disinﬂation. The
solid lines in Figure 2 report the results under perfect knowledge for this experiment. As
expected, the speed at which inﬂation is brought back to target depends on the monetary
policy response, with the more aggressive policy yielding a sharper decline in output and a
10more rapid return of inﬂation to target. But in all three cases, output and inﬂation return
to baseline within a few periods.
Imperfect knowledge with learning prolongs the dynamic response of inﬂation and output
to the inﬂation shock. Consider rst the case of the policymaker who responds to actual
inﬂation, shown by the dashed lines in Figure 2. Especially when the central bank places
signicant weight on output stabilization (bottom panel), the economy stays away from the
baseline much longer and the eects of the original shock decay quite slowly.
These dierences can be traced to the evolution of the inﬂation expectations mecha-
nism. As the economy evolves following a shock, agents' estimates of the intercept and the
autocorrelation of inﬂation climb somewhat relative to their perfect knowledge benchmarks.
This leads to a slight but persistent rise in inﬂation expectations, relative to what would
be expected under rational expectations, slowing the return of the economy to the baseline.
When the central bank places greater weight on inﬂation stabilization (top panel) the evolu-
tion of the economy deviates less from the perfect knowledge benchmark. Because the serial
correlation of the inﬂation process is much smaller in this case, the inﬂation expectations
process is better anchored and less inﬂuenced by the learning dynamics.
Relative to the policy based on observed inﬂation, the inﬂation forecast-based policy
delivers a smaller and less persistent rise in inﬂation. The dash-dotted lines show the
simulated responses of output and inﬂation when the policymaker follows the rule that
responds to the public's inﬂation forecast with the policy parameter chosen based on perfect
knowledge as before. Under this policy rule, the rise in inﬂation expectations beyond that
implied by perfect knowledge elicits a more aggressive response than in the case of the
policy that responds to observed inﬂation. The more substantial decrease in output helps
stabilize inﬂation and inﬂation expectations.
5.2 Simulation of Serially Correlated Shocks
Next we consider the dynamic responses of the model economy to a set of serially correlated
shocks. We examine the eect of such a serially correlated sequence of shocks for two reasons.
First, such a sequence of shocks amplies the eects of learning in the model and thus
provides a useful test to explore the interaction of policy and learning. Importantly, since the
11model is non-linear under learning, the economy's response following a sequence of shocks
cannot be inferred simply by scaling and adding up the responses to an individual shock
discussed earlier. Second, such unanticipated and infrequent events (given our assumption
of i.i.d. innovations) are of the kind that have posed the greatest challenge to policy and
modeling historically, as evidenced, for instance, by the events of the 1970s. This experiment
is also of interest as an illustration of the importance of initial conditions regarding the
formation of inﬂation expectations for the economy's response to a shock. Recall that the
response of inﬂation does not depend on the \source" of the shocks, that is, on whether we
assume the shocks are due to policy errors or to other disturbances. The shock we examine
is 2 percentage points in period one, and it declines in magnitude from periods two through
eight; in periods nine and beyond there is no shock.
With perfect knowledge, the series of inﬂationary shocks causes a gradual rise in the
inﬂation rate until the shocks dissipate and subsequently a decline, as shown by the solid
lines in Figure 3. The rise in inﬂation prompts a policy response leading to a temporary
decline in the output gap and subsequently a gradual rise towards the baseline. Since the
model is linear in this limiting case, these responses are simply the sum of scaled responses
to a single shock, as shown in Figure 2. Thus, as before, the speed at which inﬂation is
brought back to target depends somewhat on the monetary policy response. However, in
each case, output and inﬂation return to baseline well before the twentieth period.
Perpetual learning amplies and prolongs the response of inﬂation and output to the
sequence of shocks. For example, consider the case of the policymaker who responds to
actual inﬂation, shown by the dashed lines in Figure 3 and compare that to the response
to a single shock, shown in Figure 2. In Figure 3, the shocks cause inﬂation to rise above
the target level and stay there, while, for the policy that emphasizes output stabilization,
inﬂation continues to rise even after the shocks to the system stop. As noted earlier, the
persistence imparted by learning is inversely related to the strength of the policy response to
observed inﬂation gaps. This is further amplied following a series of correlated shocks. As
seen in the upper middle panel, with  =0 :8, the peak inﬂation response of a bit more than
2 percentage points is not appreciably larger than would occur under perfect knowledge.
12The return of inﬂation to target, however, is much more gradual. Inﬂation peaks about 3
percentage points above target when  =0 :6, and remains more than 2 percentage points
above targets after 20 periods. The results are even more dramatic when  =0 :4. In
that case, inﬂation plateaus at 4-1/2 percentage points above target. At the same time, the
output gap is consistently minus one percent. The steady downward pressure of maintaining
a small output gap in the rst few periods is insucient to overcome the eects of a stubborn
buildup of high and persistent inﬂation expectations. The gradual disinﬂation prescription
that would be optimal with perfect knowledge destabilizes the inﬂation expectations process
in this case and yields stagﬂation|the simultaneous occurrence of persistently high inﬂation
and low output.
The deterioration of the response of inﬂation under learning, relative to our perfect
knowledge benchmark, is considerably smaller with a forecast-based policy (the dash-dotted
lines in the gure). As noted earlier, under this policy rule, the rise in inﬂation expectations
beyond that implied by perfect knowledge elicits a more aggressive response than in the
case of the policy that responds to observed inﬂation. This is especially important when
a sequence of shocks, as used in this illustration, threatens to temporarily destabilize the
inﬂation expectations process. For the rst two cases, corresponding to values of e of
3.8 and 1.6, respectively, the peak response of inﬂation is only modestly above that that
obtains under perfect knowledge, and the inﬂation gap closes reasonably quickly. Even with
e =0 :8, the peak inﬂation response is only 3-1/2 percentage points and the inﬂation rate
is 1-1/2 percentage points above target after 20 periods, 3 percentage points lower than in
the case of the policy rule that responds to observed inﬂation.
As can be seen from these examples, although outcome- and forecast-based policies are
isomorphic in the limit of perfect knowledge, with perpetual learning they dier importantly.
Policies responding to private agent's forecasts of inﬂation, in particular appear better suited
to control apparent instabilities in inﬂation, following unfavorable shocks.
136 The Term Structure of Inﬂation Expectations and Bond
Yields
Economists have long been puzzled by the apparent excess sensitivity of yields on long-run
government bonds to shocks. Shiller (1979) and Mankiw and Summers (1984) point out that
long-term interest rates appear to move in the same direction following changes in short-
term interest rates and \overreact" relative to what would be expected if the expectations
hypothesis held and expectations were assumed to be rational. Changes in the federal
funds rate appear to cause long-term interest rates to generally move considerably and in
the same direction (Cook and Hahn, 1989, Roley and Sellon, 1995, Kuttner (2001). Kozicki
and Tinsley (2001a,b), Cogley (2002), and Gurkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2003), suggest
that this sensitivity could be attributed to movements in long-run inﬂation expectations that
dier from those implied by standard linear rational expectations macro models with xed
and known parameters. Our results point to an important role for learning-induced inﬂation
expectations dynamics in explaining this phenomenon and in this section we examine this
mechanism in some additional detail.
6.1 The Response of Inﬂation Expectations to Shocks
We start by examining the responses of short- and long-run inﬂation expectations to tran-
sitory and persistent shocks. We are interested in examining the evolution of inﬂation
expectations at the one-period ahead horizon, which determines the inﬂation and output
dynamics in our model, as well as at longer horizons, which relate more closely to the
historical narrative descriptions of inﬂation scares and the evolution of bond yields. The
one-period inﬂation dynamics in our model are governed by the autoregressive process (14).
Under rational expectations, this is a xed parameter process that can be used to compute
the rational k-step ahead forecast of inﬂation. The parameters of the process depend on
policy and model structure, but given policy, they are xed. Consider for example the case
of a policy responding to inﬂation, . Then, given the reduced form parameters of the
inﬂation process, c0 and c1, the law of iterated expectations can be easily applied to obtain
forecasts at all horizons from the model.
14With imperfect knowledge the translation of the forecasting model agents use to derive
one-step ahead inﬂation expectations into longer-term expectations is not immediate. As
a baseline case, we assume that agents use their reduced form estimates of the process
governing the one-period ahead forecast, (11), as if it represents the correct model of the
economy and use the law of iterated expectations with their latest estimates of that process,
c0;t and c1;t, as if these parameters were xed. This is closer to the practice of employing a
xed parameter VAR estimated with the latest data and nite memory to obtain long-term
horizon forecasts. (See e.g. Campbell and Shiller (1991) for an application to long-term
bond yields and the term structure of interest rates and Orphanides and Williams (2002)
for an application to inﬂation forecasting.)
Another alternative is to estimate a separate model for each desired long-term forecast
horizon (with nite memory). Thus, instead of relying on equation (11), to forecast inﬂation
at all horizons, agents may recursively estimate the reduced form process:
i = c0;k;t + c1;k;ti−k + vi: (15)
for each horizon, k, and use this horizon-specic forecasting model to form their expecta-
tions. This procedure is closer to a practice commonly employed for recursive estimation
and out-of-sample forecasting in the presence of concerns about parameter instability of the
forecasting model. (See e.g. Stock and Watson (1999) and Orphanides and van Norden
(2003) for applications to simulated real-time inﬂation forecasting experiments.) We will
refer to this as the \horizon-specic" forecasting model.
Note that in the limiting case of perfect knowledge (that is as  ! 0), both the horizon-
specic and baseline forecasting models produce identical forecasts. The slope coecient
in the horizon-specic model, in that case, simply equals the k-step ahead coecient of the
perfect knowledge benchmark economy. As with our one-period forecasting model, either
of these two multi-period ahead forecasting technologies collapses to the standard rational
expectations case in the perfect knowledge limit.
Figures 4 and 5 show the evolution of inﬂation expectations when the economy is sub-
jected to the shocks described in our previous experiments (shown in Figures 2 and 3, respec-
tively). In each case, we present the evolution of inﬂation expectations at the one-period-
15and ve-period-ahead horizons. For the longer horizon, these gures show expectations
corresponding to our baseline forecasting model. (Expectations using the horizon-specic
forecasting model for the ve-period-ahead horizon are qualitatively similar.)
The solid lines in Figure 4 show the evolution of expectations under perfect knowledge
following a one-period shock to inﬂation. As can be seen, for all three policies considered,
the ve-year ahead inﬂation expectations (right panels) are little aected by the shock,
which mostly aects the evolution of the one-period ahead expectation (left panels). The
initial response and speed of adjustment are inﬂuenced by the responsiveness of policy, as
expected. but the one-period ahead expectation quickly reverts to baseline, after a few
periods in each case.
Learning signicantly prolongs the impact of the shock on the one-period-ahead inﬂa-
tion expectation and, unlike the perfect knowledge benchmark, also implies a signicant
response of longer-run expectations as well. This is most evident for the case of policy rules
responding to lagged inﬂation, dashed lines. As can be seen, long-term and short-term ex-
pectations under learning co-move more closely than under rational expectations. Further,
longer-term expectations under learning signicantly \overreact" to the temporary shock
relative to what would be expected with perfect knowledge.
Figure 5 reports the parallel experiment examining the evolution of the economy to
a sequence of serially correlated shocks. This experiment illustrates how the long-term
inﬂation expectations may become unhinged from the policymakers objective for a prolonged
period, especially for a policy that places relatively little emphasis on price stability (bottom
panels). The problem is evident for forecast-based policies as well, but is less severe under
these policies.
6.2 Quantifying the Excess Sensitivity of Expectations to Shocks
One way to summarize the sensitivity of inﬂation expectations at various horizons is by
examining the regression-based slope coecient of a regression of the k-step-ahead inﬂation
forecast implied by the private agent's evolving forecasting model on the observed inﬂation
rate and a constant:
e
t+k = a0;k + a1;kt + ut:
16This is determined by the policy pursued and the expectations formation process. For an
outcome-based policy, under perfect knowledge, the k-step ahead slope coecient, a1;k,i s
given by (
1−− 
1− )k. For policy rules corresponding to a policymaker who puts nontrivial
weight on inﬂation stabilization, then, the slope coecient becomes very small even for
moderate values of k.
Under learning, inﬂation expectations are more persistent than under rational expecta-
tions with perfect knowledge. Table 1 reports the resulting slope coecients from simulation
experiments for the three alternative outcome-based policies examined above. We report
the results for the one-, three-, ve-, and ten-step-ahead forecasts. We compute results
using our baseline forecasting model and the horizon-specic forecasting model. Relative
to the case of rational expectations, under learning inﬂation expectations exhibit greater
sensitivity to actual inﬂation. With the policy that responds relatively timidly to inﬂation
(lower panel), and for the case when expectations are relatively more important determi-
nants of actual inﬂation ( =0 :9) the expectations at all three forecast horizons shown
exhibit behavior we would associate with a unit-root process in our baseline parameteriza-
tion ( =0 :05). Even with a policy that responds more aggressively to inﬂation (top panel)
inﬂation forecasts at the three- and ve-period-ahead horizons can be substantial whereas
it is nearly zero under rational expectations. The sensitivity of inﬂation expectations to
movements in actual inﬂation varies with the parameterization of the model and to illus-
trate this variation we report results for two alternative values for  for each value of 
examined.
The analysis in Table 1 implicitly assumes that agents do not incorporate any explicit
knowledge, say from pronouncements from policymakers, regarding the policymaker's ulti-
mate inﬂation objective in forming expectations. If the central bank could communicate
its numerical inﬂation target to the public, it would simplify the private agents' forecasting
problem. Because the adoption and clear communication of such a target is a key part
of the inﬂation targeting strategy that several central banks have adopted over the past
decade or so, it is of interest to examine the sensitivity of inﬂation expectations to shocks
in this case. To do so we perform a parallel set of simulations to those reported in Table 1
17under the assumption that the public exactly knows the value of  and explicitly incorpo-
rates this information in forming inﬂation expectations.11 This also allows us to examine
the extent to which the excess sensitivity of the term structure of inﬂation expectations to
shocks should be seen as being determined by uncertainty regarding the dynamics of the
economy or uncertainty regarding just the long-run inﬂation target.
As shown in Table 2, even with the assumption of a known inﬂation target inﬂation
expectations can be substantially more sensitive to shocks than in the rational expectations
benchmark. Evidently, even under the assumption that the expectations in the very long-run
are tied-down with a xed and known inﬂation target, learning regarding the dynamics of
the inﬂation process can induce substantial deviations in longer-term expectations from the
rational expectations benchmark. As with the case of an unknown target, these deviations
are larger with policy that responds relatively timidly to inﬂation and for the case when
expectations are relatively more important determinants of actual inﬂation.
Comparison of Table 2 with Table 1 conrms that inﬂation expectations under learning
are generally much less sensitive to inﬂation when the inﬂation target is assumed to be
known by the public. Indeed, the comparison indicates that the benet of better anchored
inﬂation expectations that is associated with successful communication of the central bank's
inﬂation target can be signicant. As stressed by King (2002), this is consistent with the
experience of the U.K. following the adoption of inﬂation targeting and the independence
of the Bank of England. He notes that \inﬂation has been less persistent|in the sense
that shocks die away more quickly|under inﬂation targeting than for most of the past
century." Supportive evidence is also presented by Gurkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2003)
who document a reduction in the sensitivity of U.K. forward rates to shocks over the past
several years.
11To be sure, even in an explicit inﬂation targeting regime, the public may remain uncertain regarding
the policymaker's inﬂation target, 
, so that this assumption of a perfectly known inﬂation target may be
seen as an illustrative limiting case. See Orphanides and Williams (2003) for further analysis and discussion
of the eects of greater transparency of monetary policy in this model.
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The examples reported above illustrate how the behavior of the economy can dier signi-
cantly under outcome- and forecast-based policy rules that would be identical under perfect
knowledge. We now consider the relative performance of optimized outcome- and forecast-
based rules in terms of the unconditional variances of output and inﬂation assuming serially
uncorrelated shocks.
7.1 Ecient Outcome- and Forecast-based Simple Rules
We start by examining the characteristics and performance of ecient simple one-parameter
outcome- and forecast-based policy rules. The solid line in the upper panel of Figure 6 shows
the best obtainable pairs of the standard deviations of inﬂation and the output gap under
the assumption of perfect knowledge. Figure 7 shows the corresponding policy response
parameters. The solid line in the upper panel of Figure 7 reports the corresponding optimal
values of  for an outcome-based rule; the solid line in the lower panel report the optimal
values of e for a forecast-based rule.
Within the class of one-parameter rules, policy should respond to expected inﬂation
when inﬂation stabilization is weighted heavily in the objective, but should respond to
observed inﬂation when output stabilization is relatively more important. The dashed line
in Figure 6 shows the frontier for the one-parameter outcome-based rule; the dash-dotted
line shows the frontier for the one-parameter forecast-based rule. (As before, the central
bank is assumed to respond to the private forecast of inﬂation in the case of the forecast-
based rule.) As seen in the gure, neither class of rules dominates the other, and both do
signicantly worse than would result under perfect knowledge.12
The forecast-based one-parameter rule is more eective at stabilizing inﬂation than the
outcome-based rule. The reason for this result is seen in the structural equation for inﬂation
given by equation (3). In our calibration, inﬂation depends importantly on expected inﬂa-
tion; therefore, responding to expected inﬂation is an eective strategy to control inﬂation.
12Although not shown in the gure, the dierence between the behavior of the economy under outcome-
and forecast-based rules is greatest when expected inﬂation plays a dominant role in determining inﬂation:
For values of  below 0.9, the dierences in the frontiers become smaller, and for larger values, the dierences
increase.
19More intriguing is the nding that responding to expected inﬂation is dominated when the
policymaker is suciently concerned about output stabilization. Responding too strongly
to expected inﬂation generates excessive variability of the output gap and the preferred pol-
icy responds instead to the actual inﬂation rate. Evidently, for the policymaker concerned
primarily with output ﬂuctuations and willing to downplay variability in inﬂation, expected
inﬂation proves an excessively noisy measure of underlying inﬂation.
The ecient outcome-based rules respond more aggressively to deviations of inﬂation
from target under learning than implied by perfect knowledge. As seen in the the top panel
of Figure 7, the ecient choice of  is higher under imperfect knowledge than under perfect
knowledge. This result holds across all values of !. This nding is a manifestation of the
need for greater vigilance against inﬂation when knowledge is imperfect, as discussed in
detail in Orphanides and Williams (2003).
The ecient forecast-based rule is more aggressive under learning than under perfect
knowledge only when the relative weight on inﬂation stabilization is relatively low. The
reasoning for the more aggressive policy response is the same as in the case of outcome-
based rules. Greater vigilance against inﬂation mitigates against inﬂation expectations
from becoming uncoupled from the policy objective. As can be seen in the lower panel of
Figure 7, however, for high values of ! the ecient response is more aggressive under perfect
knowledge than learning. The optimal value of e implied by perfect knowledge is very high
when the policymaker is primarily concerned with inﬂation stabilization. Under imperfect
knowledge, inﬂation expectations become \noisy" in this economy. Responding aggressively
to this noise is counterproductive; instead, the ecient simple rule is characterized by a
muted response to inﬂation expectations.
7.2 Responding to both Actual and Forecasts of Inﬂation
We now examine the performance and characteristics of policy rules that respond to both
observed inﬂation and the private forecast of inﬂation. The thin solid line in Figure 8
shows the outcomes under this ecient two-parameter rule. Responding eciently to both
expected and actual inﬂation outperforms rules responding to either only actual or only
expected inﬂation.
20The two-parameter rule uses information regarding the two determinants of inﬂation in
this model: past actual inﬂation and the private forecast of inﬂation. To dissect the features
of these rules, we compare their properties to rules that respond to the one-step-ahead
forecast of inﬂation implied by the model, which we denote p, as opposed to the private
forecast of inﬂation. Such a rule incorporates information about both observed inﬂation and
the public's forecast of inﬂation but constrains how this information is used relative to the
two-parameter rule. In particular, the implied ratio of the response to expected inﬂation
to that to observed inﬂation is given by =(1 − ). We use such rules as a benchmark to
compare against the ecient two-parameter rules.
The thin dashed line in the gure shows the outcomes when policy responds to the
policymaker's one-period-ahead forecast of inﬂation, denoted by p, assuming that the
policymaker knows the structural equation for inﬂation. This rule performs slightly better
than the ecient simple forecast-based rule but does not dominate the simple outcome-
based rule. It performs noticeably worse than the two-parameter rule. Evidently, the
public's forecast contains valuable information for the conduct of monetary policy beyond
its direct eect on inﬂation. Examination of the coecients of the two-parameter ecient
rule, shown in Figure 9, indicates that the ratio of the response to expected inﬂation to
observed inﬂation is lower than implied by a rule that responds to the policymaker's forecast
( t h er a t i oi st h es a m ef o r! = 1). That is, the ecient response in the two-parameter rule
down-weighs the information contained in the public's inﬂation forecast.
7.3 Optimal Policy with Imperfect Knowledge
Up to this point we have restricted ourselves to simple one- and two-parameter simple rules.
With imperfect knowledge, optimal policy is described by a nonlinear function of all ve
states of the system, ft;c 0;t;c 1;t;R 1;2;t;R 2;2;tg, plus a constant. We have evaluated more
complicated rules that respond linearly to all of these states and expected inﬂation and nd
that the additional terms yield trivial improvements in economic performance.
218 Conclusion
Central banks around the world pay close attention to inﬂation expectations, including
surveys, market-based measures, and economic forecasts. One cause of concern is inﬂa-
tion scares, i.e., unusual increases in inﬂation expectations, that appear to be a recurring
phenomenon. But model-based monetary policy evaluations suggest that outcome-based
monetary policy rules similar to the Taylor Rule, whereby policy responds to observed out-
put and inﬂation, do nearly as well at achieving policy goals as rules based on forecasts.
Evidently, existing research has provided little insight into why central banks pay so much
attention to inﬂation expectations.
In this paper, we explore the properties of endogenous ﬂuctuations in the formation of
expectations resulting from a process of perpetual learning and examine its implications
for the design of forecast-based monetary policy. Under rational expectations and perfect
knowledge, long-run inﬂation expectations are well anchored and do not budge in response
to aggregate shocks. With learning, however, large shocks or a sequence of shocks can
dislodge that anchor and an inﬂation scare may ensue. Inﬂation expectations can then
move substantially away from the policymaker's target. In this way, our model suggests
an important role for learning-induced inﬂation expectations dynamics for explaining the
\excess sensitivity" of long-term inﬂation expectations to aggregate shocks that is observed
in the data.
We also nd that under learning private inﬂation expectations contain potentially valu-
able information for the setting of monetary policy. In particular, policies that respond to
both observed inﬂation and private inﬂation expectations yield signicant improvements in
macroeconomic performance over simple rules that respond to observed inﬂation.
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26Table 1: Sensitivity of Inﬂation Forecasts
Correlation Between Inﬂation Forecasts and Actual Inﬂation
Rational Imperfect Knowledge
Expectations Baseline Expectations Model Horizon-Specic Expectations Model
 =0 :025  =0 :050  =0 :025  =0 :050
 =0 :75  =0 :90  =0 :75  =0 :90  =0 :75  =0 :90  =0 :75  =0 :90
Policy:  =0 :79
1-step-ahead forecast 0.21 0.29 0.40 0.36 0.58 0.29 0.40 0.36 0.58
3-step-ahead forecast 0.01 0.13 0.27 0.25 0.53 0.11 0.26 0.21 0.51
5-step-ahead forecast 0.00 0.10 0.24 0.22 0.52 0.09 0.22 0.18 0.48
10-step-ahead forecast 0.00 0.09 0.21 0.20 0.55 0.08 0.19 0.16 0.46
Policy:  =0 :62
1-step-ahead forecast 0.38 0.48 0.62 0.57 0.82 0.48 0.62 0.57 0.82
3-step-ahead forecast 0.06 0.24 0.45 0.40 0.78 0.21 0.43 0.35 0.76
5-step-ahead forecast 0.01 0.17 0.39 0.35 0.78 0.14 0.35 0.28 0.74
10-step-ahead forecast 0.00 0.14 0.33 0.31 0.83 0.12 0.29 0.23 0.73
Policy:  =0 :43
1-step-ahead forecast 0.57 0.69 0.84 0.78 0.97 0.69 0.83 0.78 0.97
3-step-ahead forecast 0.18 0.43 0.71 0.64 0.99 0.40 0.69 0.58 0.98
5-step-ahead forecast 0.06 0.33 0.65 0.58 1.02 0.28 0.62 0.49 1.01
10-step-ahead forecast 0.00 0.25 0.60 0.54 1.15 0.19 0.53 0.37 1.12
Notes: Table reports the slope coecient from a regression of the k-step-ahead inﬂation forecast implied by the private estimated
forecasting model on observed inﬂation.
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7Table 2: Sensitivity of Inﬂation Forecasts with Known Inﬂation Target
Correlation Between Inﬂation Forecasts and Actual Inﬂation
Rational Imperfect Knowledge
Expectations Baseline Expectations Model Horizon-Specic Expectations Model
 =0 :025  =0 :050  =0 :025  =0 :050
 =0 :75  =0 :90  =0 :75  =0 :90  =0 :75  =0 :90  =0 :75  =0 :90
Policy:  =0 :79
1-step-ahead forecast 0.21 0.23 0.28 0.26 0.39 0.23 0.28 0.26 0.38
3-step-ahead forecast 0.01 0.04 0.11 0.09 0.28 0.04 0.10 0.07 0.26
5-step-ahead forecast 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.04 0.23 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.21
10-step-ahead forecast 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.23 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.17
Policy:  =0 :62
1-step-ahead forecast 0.38 0.42 0.50 0.47 0.68 0.41 0.50 0.47 0.68
3-step-ahead forecast 0.06 0.13 0.25 0.21 0.57 0.11 0.24 0.18 0.55
5-step-ahead forecast 0.01 0.05 0.16 0.13 0.52 0.04 0.14 0.09 0.49
10-step-ahead forecast 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.06 0.52 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.44
Policy:  =0 :43
1-step-ahead forecast 0.57 0.63 0.74 0.69 0.91 0.63 0.74 0.69 0.91
3-step-ahead forecast 0.18 0.30 0.52 0.44 0.87 0.28 0.51 0.40 0.86
5-step-ahead forecast 0.06 0.17 0.42 0.33 0.88 0.25 0.39 0.27 0.86
10-step-ahead forecast 0.00 0.06 0.29 0.22 0.98 0.04 0.25 0.12 0.94
Notes: Table reports the slope coecient from a regression of the k-step-ahead inﬂation forecast implied by the private estimated
forecasting model on observed inﬂation.
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8Figure 1
Optimal Response to Observed Inﬂation Gap under Perfect Knowledge
0    0.25 0.50 0.75 1   








Optimal Response to Expected Inﬂation Gap under Perfect Knowledge










Notes: The top panel shows the optimal response to the observed inﬂation gap corre-
sponding to the alternative weights !; the bottom panel shows the optimal response to the
expected output gap inﬂation gap.
29Figure 2
Evolution of Economy Following an Inﬂation Shock
( =0 :9;=0 :1)
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Biased toward Output control:  =0 :4 or e =0 :8



















Evolution of Economy Following a Series of Inﬂation Shocks
( =0 :90;=0 :10)
Output Inﬂation
Biased towards inﬂation control:  =0 :8 or e =3 :8
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Biased toward Output control:  =0 :4 or e =0 :8


















Evolution of Inﬂation Expectations Following an Inﬂation Shock
One-step-ahead expectations Five-step-ahead expectations
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Evolution of Inﬂation Expectations Following a Series of Inﬂation Shocks
One-step-ahead expectations Five-step-ahead expectations
Biased towards inﬂation control:  =0 :8 or e =3 :8
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Performance of Optimized One-parameter Policy Rules
( =0 :9;=0 :1)
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34Figure 7
Optimized Response to Observed Inﬂation in One-parameter Rule
( =0 :9;=0 :1)










p Perfect knowledge benchmark
Imperfect knowledge (k = 0.05)
Optimized Response to Expected Inﬂation in One-parameter Rule

















Imperfect knowledge (k = 0.05)
35Figure 8
Performance of Optimized One- and Two-parameter Policy Rules
( =0 :9;=0 :1)
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36Figure 9
Optimized Coecients of Two-Parameter Policy Rule
( =0 :9;=0 :1)
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